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Measuring Belief in Conspiracy Theories: Validation of a 
French and English Single-Item Scale
Anthony Lantian*, Dominique Muller*, Cécile Nurra* and Karen M. Douglas†
We designed, in French and in English, a single-item scale to measure people’s general tendency to believe 
in conspiracy theories. The validity and reliability of this scale was assessed in 3 studies (total N = 555). 
In Study 1 (N = 152), positive correlations between the single-item scale and 3 other conspiracy belief 
scales on a French student sample suggested good concurrent validity. In Study 2 (N = 292), we replicated 
these results on a larger and more heterogeneous Internet American sample. Moreover, the scale showed 
good predictive validity—responses predicted participants’ willingness to receive a bi-monthly newsletter 
about alleged conspiracy theories. Finally, in Study 3 (N = 111), we observed good test-retest reliability 
and demonstrated both convergent and discriminant validity of the single-item scale. Overall these results 
suggest that the single-item conspiracy belief scale has good validity and reliability and may be used to 
measure conspiracy belief in favor of lengthier existing scales. In addition, the validation of the single-
item scale led us to develop and start validating French versions of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale, 
the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire, and a 10-item version (instead of the 15-item original version) 
of the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory.
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In a survey conducted in 2011, 25% of American respond-
ents answered “strongly agree” or “agree” to the statement 
“The current financial crisis was secretly orchestrated 
by a small number of Wall Street bankers to extend the 
power of the Federal Reserve and further their control of 
the world’s economy” (Oliver & Wood, 2014, p. 956). Simi-
larly, according to a recent Ipsos survey for Fleuve Editions 
conducted in France in 2014 (N = 1500), 20% of respond-
ents believed that the Illuminati are pulling the strings of 
international economic activity (Longuet, 2014). Another 
survey resulting from a collaboration between Counter-
point, Political Capital, the Center for Research on Prejudice, 
the Institute for Public Affairs, and the Zachor Foundation 
showed that in France, Hungary, and Slovakia, respectively 
51%, 42%, and 63% of respondents answered “totally 
agree” or “rather agreed” to the statement “Actually, it is 
not the government that runs the country: we don’t know 
who pulls the strings” (Gombin, 2013; Gyárfášová, Krekó, 
Mesežnikov, Molnár, & Morris, 2013).
Questions like these are intended to measure what is 
known as belief in conspiracy theories. This category of 
belief is defined as an “unverified and relatively implau-
sible allegation of conspiracy, claiming that significant 
events are the result of a secret plot carried out by a 
preternaturally sinister and powerful group of  people” 
(Brotherton & French, 2014, p. 238). Some scholars 
have argued that conspiracy belief may be empowering, 
allowing people to confront social hierarchies and offer 
alternative understandings of social reality (Gray, 2010; 
Sapountzis & Condor, 2013). However, conspiracy belief is 
also known to negatively affect political and pro-environ-
mental intentions (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a), intentions 
to vaccinate (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b), and is positively 
related to the rejection of scientific findings, such as 
the established link between smoking and lung cancer 
(Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013). Emerging evi-
dence of the potential consequences of conspiracy belief 
therefore means that it is important for researchers to 
have reliable and valid measures of the extent to which 
people are inclined toward conspiracist thoughts.
It is also worth noting that belief in conspiracy theo-
ries constitutes more than simple beliefs about isolated 
events, and instead forms a higher-order belief system 
(Dagnall, Drinkwater, Parker, Denovan, & Parton, 2015). 
Specifically, the extent to which a person endorses one 
specific conspiracy theory is a good predictor of the extent 
to which that person will endorse others, and this finding 
is one of the most robust in the literature (Goertzel, 1994; 
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Sutton & Douglas, 2014; Swami et al., 2011). This conspira-
cist ideation has been interpreted as a manifestation of an 
underlying conspiracy mentality (Moscovici, 1987; Imhoff & 
Bruder, 2014) or a monological belief system of mutually 
supportive beliefs (Goertzel, 1994). More broadly, it means 
that conspiracy belief is generally considered as a unidi-
mensional construct and can be seen as a more general 
indicator of cognitive functioning or conspiratorial mind-
set (Dagnall et al., 2015).
This mindset is sometimes characterized as a think-
ing disposition, involving lower levels of analytic think-
ing (Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014). 
Moreover, empirical evidence shows that people who 
believe in conspiracy theories have a specific personality 
profile. Indeed, a significant body of empirical work has 
explored the relationships between various individual 
differences variables and conspiracy belief (e.g., Bruder, 
Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013; Goertzel, 
1994; Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010; 
Swami et al., 2011). To name just a few, people who hold 
conspiracy beliefs are characterized by lower agreeable-
ness (Swami et al., 2010, 2011), lower interpersonal trust 
(Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; Goertzel, 
1994; Wagner-Egger & Bangerter, 2007), and higher open-
ness to experience (Swami et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2013).
To build knowledge about the association between per-
sonality variables and conspiracy belief, researchers have 
developed a number of scales designed to measure the 
extent to which people endorse conspiratorial explana-
tions (Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013; Bruder et al., 
2013; Douglas & Sutton, 2011; Swami et al., 2010; Wagner-
Egger & Bangerter, 2007). Some of these scales measure 
belief in conspiracy theories about only one specific event, 
such as the NASA moon landings (Swami et al., 2013), the 
Da Vinci code (Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011), or even 
fictitious conspiracies (Swami et al., 2011). Others measure 
belief in a wider range of well-known conspiracy theories 
such as those associated with the World Trade Center 9/11 
attacks, the death of Princess Diana, the NASA moon land-
ings, and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy 
(e.g., Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Swami et al., 2010). Other 
scales still measure what is known as a generalized con-
spiratorial mindset where more general conspiracist views 
are examined rather than belief in specific conspiracy 
theories (e.g., Brotherton et al., 2013; Bruder et al., 2013). 
Although they take different approaches, all of the existing 
scales that have been developed to measure conspiracy belief 
could be, in certain contexts (e.g., in a study where time or 
the number of questions is limited), reasonably lengthy—all 
involve participants answering a number of questions and 
range from 5 questions (Bruder et al., 2013) to 15 questions 
long (Brotherton et al., 2013; Swami et al., 2010).
Although these scales have proven very fruitful in 
extending knowledge of the psychological factors that 
are associated with conspiracy belief, we feel that they 
may be not suited for all situations. More generally, the 
choice to include or not to include a scale could be based 
on pragmatic considerations such as space in a question-
naire or mean time of completion (Konrath, Meier, & 
Bushman, 2014). Due to its limited space and short com-
pletion time, a single-item measure can increase the 
likelihood of being included and, by extension, contrib-
uting to the knowledge of the personality traits associ-
ated with conspiracy belief. Moreover, longer scales can 
increase the fatigue, boredom, and noncooperation of 
the respondent (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001; 
Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1991) and can decrease 
the response rate  compared to shorter scales (Edwards, 
Roberts, Sandercock, & Frost, 2004). Also, if conspiracy 
belief needs to be assessed on more than one occasion, 
lengthier scales pose significant demands on respond-
ents. Finally, a single-item scale could easily be included 
as a control of the baseline level of the general trend to 
believe in conspiracy theories or used as a prescreening 
test. Indeed, answering just one question about con-
spiracy belief may lead to less suspicion than answering 
several questions about it. For all these reasons, we 
 propose, through three studies, to validate a single-item 
scale designed to assess people’s  tendency to believe in 
conspiracy theories. To the best of our  knowledge, no 
single-item scale has yet been proposed.
At first glance, it may seem provocative to argue that 
one can measure a complex construct like conspiracy 
belief with a single item, especially because there are an 
immense number of existing conspiracy theories about 
a vast range of distinct events (Knight, 2003). However, 
as we already mentioned, knowing the level of people’s 
belief in one specific conspiracy theory helps to some-
what estimate their belief in other conspiracy theories, 
and belief in conspiracy theories is largely seen to be a 
general construct rather than a set of separate beliefs. 
Consistent with this logic, endorsing a specific conspiracy 
theory has been found to predict the degree to which peo-
ple endorse even mutually incompatible conspiracy theo-
ries (Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 2012), as well as fictional 
conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2011). It is therefore not 
unreasonable to attempt to tap into a general propensity 
to believe in conspiracy theories with just a single-item 
measure.
More generally, it is also important to keep in mind 
that a number of well-established constructs in psychol-
ogy have been successfully measured with single-item 
scales, such as self-esteem (Robins et al., 2001), anxiety 
(Davey, Barratt, Butow, & Deeks, 2007), and more recently 
narcissism (Konrath et al., 2014). One could argue, how-
ever, that a crucial shortcoming of single-item measures 
is the increased vulnerability to random measurement 
errors (Konrath et al., 2014; Schmidt & Hunter, 1996), 
compared to longer measures that can compensate for 
accidental errors committed by participants when they 
answer questions. The answer to this concern is  twofold. 
First, sometimes the primary goal of a researcher is 
to  benefit from the advantages of single-item meas-
ures, such as ease of administration, time, and energy 
 savings, even if there is a reasonable reduction in reli-
ability. Second, it is not always the case that single-item 
scales are associated with poor psychometric properties 
(Rammstedt & Beierlein, 2014).
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Construction of the Single-Item Conspiracy 
Belief Scale
Rather than shortening one of the existing scales, which 
typically use several questions to examine conspiracy 
belief, our goal was to create a single-item conspiracy 
belief scale tapping into the general propensity to believe 
in conspiracy theories. That is, we sought to capture the 
breadth of conspiracy mentality with a single question. 
To ensure good face validity, we developed the general 
instructions of the single-item conspiracy belief scale by 
modeling it on the instructions given in the introduc-
tions to two other conspiracy belief scales (Brotherton 
et al., 2013; Swami et al., 2010). Notably, we tried to insist 
on the idea of the existence of debates and controver-
sies about the origin of certain events and allegations of 
cover-ups. These ideas refer directly to influential defi-
nitions of conspiracy belief (Douglas & Sutton, 2008; 
Keeley, 1999). More specifically, our instructions give exam-
ples of political and social events (e.g., the assassination 
of President John F. Kennedy) that have been the source 
of numerous conspiracy theories. As in other research, we 
deliberately chose not to mention the word “conspiracy 
theory” (Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Wood & Douglas, 2013), 
knowing that the term may be negatively connoted (Hus-
ting & Orr, 2007). The item specifically asked to what 
extent people think the authorities frequently hide the 
truth regarding the real origin of some events. Although 
in the instructions we designate the potential conspira-
tors as “powerful individual or organizations (for exam-
ple secret services or government)”, we chose to focus the 
question on attitudes toward the version of the events 
given by authorities. We did so because the authorities 
are generally those who establish and disseminate the 
official explanation. Moreover, systematically question-
ing the official version provided by authorities is a criti-
cal feature of belief in conspiracy theories (Keeley, 1999; 
Wood & Douglas, 2013). Furthermore, the authorities are 
easily accused of either being involved, infiltrated, or at 
least manipulated by the conspirators (Melley, 2002). Like 
Swami and colleagues (2010), we used a nine-point scale 
(1 = Completely false to 9 = Completely true), which allows 
participants to express a relatively nuanced answer. As a 
first step, we designed the French version of the scale and 
this version served as the basis for the English version (see 
Appendix A). 
Overview
The purpose of Study 1 was to assess the concurrent 
validity of the French version of the single-item con-
spiracy belief scale by studying the correlations between 
this new scale and three other scales known to measure 
conspiracy belief. In Study 2, we replicated the test of 
the concurrent validity with a larger and more hetero-
geneous sample, but now using an English version of 
the scale. In addition, Study 2 examined the predictive 
 validity of the scale. Finally, we designed Study 3 to 
assess test-retest reliability, as well as the convergent and 




Participants were 152 students from a masters course 
in education (125 female and two respondents did not 
indicate their gender), with a mean age of 22.88 years 
(SD = 3.53). During class time, participants completed a 
booklet containing all of the measures, administered in a 
counterbalanced order (four possible orders2).
Materials
The single-item conspiracy belief scale was introduced by 
a short paragraph (see Appendix A). It was followed by a 
single item consisting of the affirmation: “I think that the 
official version of the events given by the authorities very 
often hides the truth.” (1 = Completely false to 9 = Com-
pletely true), with a higher score reflecting higher belief in 
conspiracy theories.
The other scale is the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs 
scale (GCB; Brotherton et al., 2013), which is a 15-item 
scale (each measured from 1 = Definitely not true to 
5 = Definitely true) that measures conspiracist ideation 
using 15 generic statements (e.g., “Certain significant 
events have been the result of the activity of a small 
group who secretly manipulate world events”). To pro-
duce a French version of this scale, three researchers 
independently translated the scale (with the instructions) 
from English to French and agreed on a single  version. 
Then, a bilingual researcher back-translated this ver-
sion from French to English. Finally, one of the three 
original English-to-French translators plus two other 
researchers compared the equivalences between the last 
back-translated version to the original. The few discrep-
ancies were resolved after discussion (see Appendix B). 
The internal consistency of the scale was high (α = .85). 
All of the items were averaged to form a single score, 
with higher scores indicating higher belief in conspiracy 
theories3.
We also included the Belief in Conspiracy Theories 
Inventory (BCTI; Swami et al., 2010; Swami et al., 
2011). Although this scale was originally composed of 
15 items (each answered from 1 = Completely false to 
9 = Completely true), we chose, guided by face validity, 
to present only items referring to events that French 
 people would know about4. Thus, we chose 10 items and 
translated them into French using the same procedure 
as above. For convenience, hereafter we will refer to this 
short version of the BCTI scale as the BCTI-10. All of the 
items were averaged to form a single score (α = .83), with 
higher scores representing higher belief in conspiracy 
theories (see Appendix C).
We also included, the Conspiracy Mentality 
Questionnaire (CMQ; Bruder et al., 2013), a five-item 
scale (each answered from 0 = Certainly not to 100% = 
Certain) intended to measure what the authors refer to 
as a general conspiracy mentality (e.g., “there are secret 
organizations that greatly influence political deci-
sions”). We translated all of the items to French with 
the same procedure as above, and we averaged them 
to form a single score (α = .79), with higher scores 
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corresponding to higher belief in conspiracy theories 
(see Appendix D). 
Finally, participants indicated their gender and age, 
and were orally debriefed and thanked at the end 
of the study. No compensation was offered for their 
participation.
Results
As can be seen in Table 1 and as expected, the single-
item conspiracy belief scale was positively correlated with 
the three other conspiracy belief measures. The Pearson’s 
r correlation coefficients ranged from .41 to .50. More 
generally, these results seem to indicate a relative  stability 
and homogeneity between all of the bivariate correla-
tions we examined, whichever conspiracy belief scale was 
used. It is also noteworthy that the relationships between 
the single-item and the three critical measures were not 
moderated by order (ps > .58). This was also the case in 
Study 2 (ps > .09) and will therefore not be mentioned 
further.
Discussion
Study 1 was the first step in examining the validity of our 
new single-item measure of conspiracy belief. We assessed 
the concurrent validity of this new scale by exploring its 
relationship with three other measures of  conspiracy 
belief that are commonly used in the  literature. As 
expected, we found positive correlations between our 
single-item measure and each of the three other conspir-
acy belief scales. These correlations are not as high as one 
could expect. It is worth noticing, however, these correla-
tions are similar in size to what we found between the 
other validated conspiracy scales.
In sum, Study 1 has shown that the single-item con-
spiracy belief scale shares satisfactory variance with 
other validated instruments intended to capture belief in 
conspiracy theories. However, two possible weaknesses 
could be the relative homogeneity of our sample—who 
were all students from a masters course in education and 
predominantly women—as well as the modest size of this 
sample (N < 200). We addressed these two weaknesses in 
Study 2.
Study 2
Study 2 was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk), which is a crowdsourcing service that enables 
researchers to reach a more diverse sample than the tra-
ditional samples used in psychology (Berinsky, Huber, & 
Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). 
Because participants on MTurk are mostly  American 
 citizens (or people from India, but we restricted our 
sample to Americans) it also allows us to generalize 
our results to an American sample. Finally, to test 
the  predictive validity of the single-item measure, we 
added a quasi-behavioral measure intended to examine 
if responses on the single-item conspiracy belief scale 
could predict a subsequent  decision related to  conspiracy 
theories—in this case the decision to subscribe to 









































M 6.32 2.82 3.68 7.19 22.88 −
SD 2.03 0.64 1.42 1.31 3.53 −
N 1515 152 1515 152 1495 1505
Table 1: Bivariate Correlations (With 95% Confidence Intervals) Between all the Variables (Study 1).
Notes:
*** = p < .001.
1 GCB = Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale. 
2 BCTI-10 = Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory, 10-items version.
3 CMQ = Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire.
4 Gender is coded -0.5 for woman (n = 125) and 0.5 for man (n = 25). Values represent point-biserial correlations.
5 Variation in sample size is due to missing values. 
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Participants 
We recruited 292 American participants on MTurk. In 
total, 25 participants were excluded from the sample 
(although it should be noted that the main findings 
remain the same when including these participants in 
the analyses). Of these, 18 were excluded because they 
made two or more errors on three attention check items 
explained below (a criterion fixed before the study), two 
because their answers were considered as being not seri-
ous (their answers were the same for every single ques-
tion), one because they participated twice, two because 
they were not Americans, one because their data were 
not correctly recorded, and one because they expressed 
suspicion about the authenticity of the newsletter. In 
total, our final sample was composed of 267 participants 
(161 women, Mage = 34.69, SDage = 12.55). Participants 
were paid US$ 0.30 for their participation. 
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure of Study 2 were the same as 
Study 1 with four exceptions: (1) all of the material was in 
English, (2) because we no longer used a French sample, 
we provided the complete version of the BCTI (15-item 
version) instead of the 10-item version, (3) three attention 
check items were added throughout the study to detect 
non-diligent participants, such as “so we can be sure that 
you are reading the questions carefully, please answer 
“Completely True” to this question” (Jolley & Douglas, 
2014b), (4) thanks to Qualtrics software options (http://
www.qualtrics.com/), all of the possible order combina-
tions of the four measures of conspiracy belief could be 
presented, giving a total of 24 possible orders.
After the four conspiracy belief measures, we added a 
quasi-behavioral measure (see Appendix E). This meas-
ure gave participants the possibility of registering for a 
newsletter (with the frequency of two private messages 
a month) about alleged conspiracy theories. To respect 
the anonymity of participants and avoid a floor effect, 
participants did not need to enter their email, but simply 
to choose between “yes” or “no” to receive this newsletter 
via private messages on MTurk. Importantly, we specified 
that their decision regarding this newsletter would have 
no impact on their payment. At the end of the proce-
dure, just after entering demographic information as in 
Study 1, participants were thanked and debriefed about 
the true objective of the study and the fact that the news-
letter was bogus.
Results
All the results are presented in Table 2. The single-
item conspiracy belief scale was again significantly and 
positively correlated with the three other conspiracy 
belief scales measured5. All three bivariate Pearson’s 
r correlation coefficients fell within a range of .66 to .72. 
 Unexpectedly, by comparing the three bivariate 
 correlations between the previous French sample and 
the  American sample (by using Fisher r-to-z transforma-
tions) we observed that the effect sizes were significantly 
stronger in the American sample (Study 2) than in the 
French sample (Study 1).
Regarding the quasi-behavioral measure, 27.72% 
(n = 74) of the participants agreed to register for the news-
letter about alleged conspiracy theories. More important, 
a point-biserial correlation between the single-item con-
spiracy belief scale and the decision to register for the 
newsletter revealed a significant relationship between 
these two variables (note that a logistic regression also 
revealed a significant relationship, p = .008) such that 
higher responses on the single-item measure predicted 
greater willingness to receive the newsletter. It must 
also be mentioned that the three other conspiracy belief 
measures were also significant predictors of agreement to 
 register for the newsletter.
Discussion
Study 2 provides additional support for the concurrent 
validity of the single-item conspiracy belief scale by suc-
cessfully showing that it shares a substantial amount of 
variance with the other lengthier measures of conspiracy 
belief. It is also noteworthy that in Study 2, we found 
large correlations (with small confidence intervals) while 
some of the correlations were only modest in Study 1. 
These differences could be due to cultural differences 
or to other factors that varied between our two studies, 
such as the mode of administration (internet versus pen-
cil-and-paper studies) or differences in sample homoge-
neity. For instance, one might wonder whether the gen-
der imbalance in Study 1 (with a majority of women in 
the sample) could be responsible for these differences. 
This seems unlikely, however, because in Study 1 (with 
a majority of women in the sample) the sizes of these 
correlations were descriptively larger for women. Again, 
this result adds evidence for the convergent validity of 
the single-item scale.
Finally, we were also able to provide evidence for the 
predictive validity of the single-item conspiracy belief 
scale by showing that responses on this scale predicted 
who agreed to receive a newsletter about alleged con-
spiracies (even if the size of the effect is only small-to-
medium, see Cohen, 1992). Because this decision was also 
predicted by the other three measures, this adds to both 
to the validation of our scale (by showing that our scale as 
well as previous scales predicted the same behavior) and 
to the other scales. Indeed, it should be emphasized that 
so far, the predictive validity of conspiracy belief at the 
behavioral level has not been well investigated. With the 
exception of a small number of studies that have meas-
ured behavioral intentions (e.g., Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, 
2014b), little is known about how conspiracy belief may 
influence people’s decision-making and then their actual 
behaviors. Thus the present findings also represent a 
contribution regarding the extent to which  conspiracy 
belief may translate at least into low level action 
(i.e.,  asking for more information about conspiracies).
Study 3
In Study 3, we aimed to assess the test-retest reliability, 
as well as the convergent and discriminant validity of 
the single-item conspiracy belief scale. Because it was 
necessary to test the same participants on two separate 
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1. Single-item 
conspiracy belief
2. GCB1 3. BCTI2 4. CMQ3 5. Newsletter4 6. Age 7. Gender5
1. −
2. .72*** a (z = 3.49)
[.66, .77]
−
3. .66*** a (z = 2.55)
[.59, .72]
.83*** a (z = 3.85)
[.79, .86]
−
4. .70*** a (z = 4.20)
[.64, .76]
.75*** a(z = 3.46)
[.70, .80]




































M 5.87 2.78 4.01 6.96 − 34.69 −
SD 2.32 0.93 1.76 1.93 − 12.55 −
N 267 267 267 267 267 267 267
α − .94 .92 .84 − − −
Table 2: Bivariate Correlations (With 95% Confidence Intervals) Between all the Variables (Study 2).
Notes:
† = p = .072. * = p < .05. ** = p < .01. *** = p < .001.
The symbols (*) and (†) mean that these effects were not predicted and do not remain significant or marginally significant 
when correcting the alpha level with a Bonferroni correction.
1 GCB = Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale. 
2 BCTI = Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory.
3 CMQ = Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire.
4 Newsletter is coded −0.5 for answer “no” (n = 193) and 0.5 for answer “yes” (n = 74). Values represent point-biserial 
correlations.
5 Gender is coded −0.5 for woman (n = 161) and 0.5 for man (n = 106). Values represent point-biserial correlations.
a Indicates that the bivariate correlation found in Study 2 is significantly different (p < .05) from the bivariate correla-
tion found in Study 1. Comparisons have been made by using Fisher’s r-to-z transformations (z values are indicated in 
brackets). To be strictly comparable, comparisons involving BCTI variable have been made by taking only the 10 items 
from the BCTI 10-item version (M = 3.91, SD = 1.85, α = .89).
 occasions, we went back to using a French sample (with 
a different sample from Study 1). To examine convergent 
validity, we measured paranormal belief, which is known 
to correlate positively with responses on existing conspir-
acy belief scales (Brotherton et al., 2013; Darwin, Neave, & 
Holmes, 2011; Lobato, Mendoza, Sims, & Chin, 2014). We 
also measured interpersonal trust which is known to cor-
relate negatively with conspiracy belief (Abalakina-Paap 
et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Wagner-Egger & Bangerter, 
2007). We expected the same pattern of results using our 
single-item conspiracy belief scale. Regarding discrimi-
nant validity, we measured self-consciousness since there 
are no theoretical reasons to predict a substantial positive 
or negative relationship with conspiracy belief.
Participants and Procedure
We recruited 111 French psychology undergraduate stu-
dents (95 female, and one respondent who did not indi-
cate their gender), with a mean age of 21.66 (SD = 5.34). 
The study took place in two sessions separated by 14 days. 
Level of belief in conspiracy theories was assessed at Time 
1 (N = 96) and re-assessed at Time 2 (N = 90, among which 
75 had participated at both Time 1 and 2) with four addi-
tional measures detailed below. We administered these 
measures in a counterbalanced order (three possible 
orders), with the single-item conspiracy belief scale always 
in first position to avoid unwanted sources of variation.
Materials
To assess test-retest reliability (only) the single-item con-
spiracy belief scale was assessed at both Time 1 and Time 2. 
At Time 2, we introduced the GCB scale (Brotherton 
et al., 2013) to have a reliable element of comparison. The 
internal consistency of this scale was high (α = .86).
To measure paranormal belief, we used the French 
 version (Bouvet, Djeriouat, Goutaudier, Py, & Chabrol, 2014) 
of the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS-R, Tobacyk, 
2004). The French version of this scale is composed of 
24 items (e.g., “Black magic really exists”) with a seven-point 
rating scale (1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree). 
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This scale was originally composed of seven dimensions 
but as in previous investigations we chose to only use a 
single score, by summing all the items, to form a total par-
anormal belief score (Darwin et al., 2011; Tobacyk, 2004). 
Higher scores mean greater belief in paranormal 
 phenomena (α = .93).
We also used a French version of the four-item trust 
scale (Wagner-Egger & Bangerter, 2007), adapted from 
Goertzel (1994). For example, participants were asked 
to indicate on a five-point scale (1 = Not at all, 5 = Very 
much) to what extent they could trust their neighbors. 
We averaged the items to create a mean score of trust. 
Higher scores were indicative of higher levels of trust 
(α = .74).
Self-Consciousness was assessed with a French 
 version (Pelletier & Vallerand, 1990) of the Revised Self-
Consciousness Scale (Scheier & Carver, 1985). The scale 
is composed of 22 items (two items are reverse-scored) 
on a four-point rating scale (0 = Not at all like me, 
1 = A  little like me, 2 = Somewhat like me, 3 = A lot like 
me). The Revised Self-Consciousness Scale is subdivided 
into three subscales: private self-consciousness (nine 
summed items, e.g., “I think about myself a lot”, higher 
score indicates higher private self-consciousness, α = .66), 
public self-consciousness (seven summed items, e.g., “I’m 
usually aware of my appearance”, higher score indicates 
higher public self-consciousness, α = .79), and social 
anxiety (six summed items, e.g., “I get embarrassed very 
easily”, where higher scores indicate higher social  anxiety, 
α = .71).
To ensure that we could connect the answers given by 
participants at Time 1 and Time 2, each participant was 
asked to provide a personal code (only known by them) 
at the beginning of the two sessions. At the end of the 
study, participants reported their gender and age, and 
were orally debriefed and thanked. No compensation was 
offered for their participation.
Results
We found significant test-retest reliability of the single-
item conspiracy belief scale (r = .75, Table 3). This result 
indicates that the single-item conspiracy belief scale has a 
good stability over a period of two weeks.
In Table 3 we present the correlations between all 
variables (including the single-item scale at both Time 1 
and Time 2). Inspection of this table reveals that, in 
accordance with what could be expected based on 
the literature, our single-item conspiracy belief scale 
(both in Time 1 and Time 2) was positively associated 
with paranormal belief (although only marginally so at 
Time 1) and negatively associated with interpersonal 
trust. This suggests good convergent validity of this 
scale. Additionally, the other conspiracy belief measure 
(i.e., the GCB) showed the same pattern of relationships 
with these two variables. 
Finally, the non-significant relationship between the 
single-item conspiracy belief scale and the three sub-
dimensions of self-consciousness indicates good discrimi-
nant validity. Again, the other conspiracy belief measure 
(i.e., the GCB) showed the same pattern.
Discussion
Results of Study 3 show that the single-item conspiracy 
belief scale has good stability over time. Moreover, the fact 
that, in agreement with previous findings, this measure 
is positively related to paranormal belief and negatively 
related to interpersonal trust, suggests good convergent 
validity. We also provided evidence for the discriminant 
validity of the single-item scale by showing small and 
non-reliable correlations with an unrelated construct (i.e., 
self-consciousness). This evidence therefore suggests that 
the single-item conspiracy belief scale has good psycho-
metrics properties.
General Discussion
The purpose of these three studies was to test the validity 
of the single-item conspiracy belief scale. Despite its brev-
ity and the limitations inherent to all single-item scales, 
the three current studies provide evidence that this is a 
valid and reliable measure of belief in conspiracy theo-
ries. More precisely, we demonstrated concurrent validity 
through the substantial shared variance between this new 
scale and three existing scales from the conspiracy theory 
literature. Moreover, Study 2 not only extends the exter-
nal validity of the measure by using an American sample 
obtained from the Internet, but also revealed the predic-
tive validity of the scale. We showed that this single-item 
conspiracy belief scale could predict a subsequent deci-
sion (having consequences outside the context of the 
study) regarding the registration for a bi-monthly news-
letter about alleged conspiracy theories.
Study 3 provides further support for the scale by dem-
onstrating that it has good stability over time. In line with 
good convergent and discriminant validities, this study 
showed that responses to the single-item scale were asso-
ciated (or not associated) with measures of personality 
variables known to be related (or not related) to conspir-
acy belief. By showing that belief in conspiracy theories 
is positively associated with paranormal belief and nega-
tively associated with trust, we made a contribution to the 
cumulative knowledge about the personality characteris-
tics of people who display conspiracist thought.
Further information regarding the psychometric 
properties of the scale is obtained by collapsing all the 
data from the three studies (N = 514, taking only the 
T1 measure of Study 3, M = 6.04, 95% CI [5.85, 6.22], 
SD = 2.19, Mdn = 6, mode = 7, min = 1, max = 9). We can 
observe that this unimodal distribution is approximately 
symmetric (skew = -0.51), although slightly negatively 
skewed. This trend can be additionally highlighted by 
the value of the mode and the fact that the confidence 
 interval of the mean did not include the middle point of 
the scale (i.e., 5).
Another important contribution of our work is to pro-
vide French versions of three popular conspiracy belief 
scales: the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale (Brotherton 
et al., 2013), the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire 
(Bruder et al., 2013), and the Belief in Conspiracy Theories 
Inventory (Swami et al., 2010). As for the GCB, we included 
our French version of this scale in our two French  studies 
(i.e., Studies 1 and 3). By doing so, our studies provide 
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data showing that our French version of the GCB has 
good predictive, convergent, and discriminant validities. 
As for the CMQ, our French version was included in Study 
1 and its results provide data showing a good predictive 
validity. The same conclusion applies for our French ver-
sion of the BCTI, but it worth recalling that this French 
version includes 10 items instead of 15 as in the original 
version (we did so because 5 items were less relevant in 
the French context). In addition, these scales had good 
reliability. Finally, we need to mention that since the 
primary role of our work was not to fully validate these 
scales, we did not study the multidimensional structure 
of the two longest scales. We limited our investigation to 
the way these two scales are often used, namely as global 
measures of belief in conspiracy theories.
Of course, the single-item conspiracy belief scale is 
not immune to criticisms. One could first argue that 
although it is a single-item scale, instructions are quite 
long and that in terms of the number of words, the  overall 
scale might be almost as long as say a 5-item measure. 
We would argue that the instructions given prior to the 
rating scale might be necessary to narrow the focus of 
the measure to belief in conspiracy theories and noth-
ing else. Of course one could test whether the presence 
or the absence (or a shorter version) of the instructions 
produces any meaningful difference in the answers, but 
the challenge would be to ensure that the instructions 
are still easily understood. Importantly, we would also 
argue that reading instructions cannot be directly com-
pared with thinking about and answering each item. To 
test this reasoning, we conducted an additional short 
study. In this study, we asked 37 American MTurkers to 
complete the single-item conspiracy belief scale and the 
5-item Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ; Bruder 
et al., 2013) in a counterbalanced order. Importantly, we 
recorded the time it took to complete each scale. These 
data show that participants were significantly faster 
in answering the single-item conspiracy belief scale 
(M = 23.13 s, SD = 12.02) than they were to answer the 
5-item CMQ (M = 36.48 s, SD = 24.01), t(36) = 4.20, 
p < .001, η² = .33. 
Another limitation of our studies could be that we 
applied our scale to only two countries (i.e., France and 
the United States). The validity of the scale in other coun-
tries should be systematically investigated in future stud-
ies. In the same vein, the unbalanced samples with a 
majority of women (especially in Studies 1 and 3), as well 
as their specificity (i.e., students and MTurkers) could limit 
the generalizability of our findings. Also, we recognize 
that this instrument is not adjusted for research intended 
to explore the potential multidimensionality of conspir-
acy belief. Nevertheless, until now, even when assumed 
multidimensional conspiracy belief scales were used, only 
the unidimensional aspect of conspiracy belief was con-
sidered (Brotherton & Eser, 2015; Brotherton & French, 2014; 
Brotherton & French, 2015). Finally, one might wonder 
whether the single-item conspiracy scale measure only a 
sub-dimension of conspiracy beliefs (e.g., governmental 
conspiracy theories). The fact that the single-item con-
spiracy belief scale correlates significantly with all the 
conspiracy belief subscales, in Studies 1 and 2, shows that 
it is not the case.
In conclusion, we have shown that the single-item con-
spiracy belief scale described in this research satisfies reli-
ability and validity requirements and can therefore be 
used as a reliable and valid measure of the extent to which 
a person endorses conspiratorial explanations. Since the 
instrument is easy to administer, with minimum time 
burden to researchers and participants, we recommend its 
use particularly when time is constrained, in large-scale 
surveys where the number of questions is limited, or in 
exploratory research. 
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Appendix A
Instructions and response formats of the single-item 
conspiracy belief scale.
French version
Différents évènements politiques ou sociaux importants 
(comme par exemple les attentats du 11 Septembre 
2001, la mort de Lady Diana, l’assassinat de JFK) font 
l’objet de discussions. Il est suggéré que la « version 
 officielle » de ces évènements serait une tentative de 
dissimulation de la vérité au grand public. Cette « version 
officielle » masquerait le fait que ces évènements aient 
été planifiés à l’avance et secrètement préparés par une 
alliance cachée d’individus ou d’organisations puissantes 
(comme par exemple les services secrets ou un gou-
vernement) ayant des intentions malveillantes. Et vous, 
qu’en pensez-vous ? 
Pour répondre, vous devez indiquer (en cochant la 
case appropriée) dans quelle mesure la phrase ci-dessous 
correspond à ce que vous pensez : 
Complètement faux Complètement vrai
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Je pense que la version officielle des évènements 
donnée par les autorités cache très souvent la vérité
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
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English version
Some political and social events are debated (for exam-
ple 09/11 attacks, the death of Lady Diana, the assassina-
tion of John F. Kennedy). It is suggested that the “official 
version” of these events could be an attempt to hide the 
truth to the public. This “official version” could mask the 
fact that these events have been planned and secretly 
prepared by a covert alliance of powerful individuals or 
organizations (for example secret services or government). 
What do you think?
To answer, please indicate to what extent the sentence 
below represents how you think about this:
Completely false Completely true
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I think that the official version of the events given 
by the authorities very often hides the truth
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Appendix B 
French version of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale 
(Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013).
Il est souvent question de savoir si oui ou non le 
grand public a accès à toute la vérité concernant 
diverses questions importantes. Cette brève étude a été 
conçue pour évaluer vos croyances sur certaines de ces 
questions. Veuillez indiquer sur l’échelle suivante, s’il 
vous plait, dans quelle mesure vous croyez que chaque 
déclaration est susceptible d’être vraie en fonction de 
l’échelle suivante : certainement pas vraie, probablement 
pas vraie, indécis, probablement vraie, certainement 
vraie.
 1.  L’État est impliqué dans le meurtre de citoyens inno-
cents et/ou de personnalités célèbres, et le garde 
secret.
 2.  Le pouvoir détenu par les chefs d’État est secondaire 
comparé à celui de petits groupes inconnus qui con-
trôlent réellement la politique mondiale.
 3.  Des organisations secrètes communiquent avec les 
extraterrestres, mais cachent ce fait au grand public.
 4.  La propagation de certains virus et/ou maladies est 
le résultat d’actions délibérées et dissimulées de 
certaines organisations.
 5.  Des groupes de scientifiques manipulent, fabriquent ou 
suppriment des preuves pour tromper le grand public.
 6.  L’État permet et commet des actes de terrorisme sur 
son propre sol, camouflant son implication.
 7.  Un petit groupe secret de personnes est responsable 
de toutes les principales décisions qui sont prises 
dans le monde, comme entrer en guerre.
 8.  Des preuves de contacts extraterrestres sont dis-
simulées au grand public.
 9.  Des technologies permettant le contrôle de la pensée 
sont utilisées sur les gens à leur insu.
10.  De nouvelles technologies de pointe qui pourraient 
nuire à l’industrie actuelle sont gardées secrètes.
11.  L’État utilise des personnes comme boucs émis-
saires pour cacher son implication dans des activités 
criminelles.
12.  Certains évènements importants ont été le résultat 
de l’activité de petits groupes qui manipulent secrète-
ment les évènements mondiaux.
13.  Certaines observations et rumeurs concernant les 
OVNIs ont été planifiées ou organisées pour détourner 
l’attention du grand public de véritables contacts 
extraterrestres. 
14.  Des expériences impliquant de nouvelles drogues ou 
technologies sont régulièrement menées sur le grand 
public à son insu ou sans son consentement.
15.  Beaucoup d’informations importantes sont délibéré-
ment dissimulées au public pour préserver des inté-
rêts personnels.
Appendix C 
French version of the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inven-
tory (Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010).
De nombreuses discussions ont eu lieu concernant dif-
férents évènements historiques. Ces discussions  suggèrent 
que la « version officielle » de ces évènements serait une 
tentative de dissimulation de la vérité au grand public. 
Ci-dessous, voici une liste d’évènements pour lesquels 
la version officielle a été contestée. Pour chacun de ces 
évènements, nous aimerions que vous indiquiez dans 
quelle mesure vous croyez que la  version proposée des 
évènements (version non-officielle) est vraie ou fausse en 
cochant la case correspondant au numéro approprié.
 1.  Un groupe puissant et secret connu sous le nom du 
 Nouvel Ordre Mondial, projette de diriger le monde à 
travers la mise en place d’un gouvernement autonome 
mondial qui viendrait remplacer le gouvernement 
souverain.
 2.  Les services américains ont intentionnellement créé 
l’épidémie du SIDA et l’ont administré aux Noirs et 
aux homosexuels dans les années 70.
 3.  L’assassinat de Martin Luther King est le résultat d’une 
conspiration organisée par les services gouvernemen-
taux américains comme la CIA et le FBI.
 4.  L’atterrissage d’Apollo sur la lune ne s’est jamais 
passé et a été monté dans un studio de film à 
Hollywood.
 5.  La Zone 51 dans le Nevada, aux États-Unis, est une 
base militaire secrète qui abrite des vaisseaux extra-
terrestres cachés et/ou des corps d’extraterrestres.
 6.  Le gouvernement des États-Unis a laissé faire les 
attaques du 11 Septembre de façon à avoir une excuse 
pour réaliser leurs objectifs à l’étranger (par exemple 
les guerres en Afghanistan et en Irak) et nationaux 
(par exemple l’attaque des libertés civiles) qui ont été 
déterminés avant les attaques.
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 7.  L’assassinat de John F. Kennedy n’a pas été commis 
par un tireur isolé, Lee Harvey Oswald, mais par une 
conspiration organisée pour tuer le Président.
 8.  En Juillet 1947, les forces militaires des États-Unis ont récu-
péré les débris d’un vaisseau extraterrestre à Roswell, au 
Nouveau Mexique. Ils ont ensuite caché cet évènement.
 9.  La mort de la princesse Diana n’était pas un accident, 
mais plutôt un assassinat organisé par des membres 
de la famille royale britannique qui ne l’aimait pas.
10.  Des groupes d’intérêts suppriment, ou ont par le 
passé supprimé, des technologies qui pourraient pro-
duire de l’énergie à coût réduit ou à émission pollu-
ante réduite.
Appendix D 
French version of the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire 
(Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013)
Pour chacune de ces affirmations ci-dessous, veuillez 
cocher la case correspondant au chiffre approprié pour 
indiquer, selon vous, dans quelle mesure vous pensez que 
ces affirmations sont vraies. Il n’y a pas de réponse objec-
tivement vraie ou fausse, nous sommes intéressés par vos 
opinions personnelles. 
Je pense que :
. . . beaucoup de choses très importantes se produisent 
dans le monde dont le grand public n’est pas informé.
. . . les politiciens ne nous disent généralement pas ce qui 
motive réellement leurs décisions.
. . . les agences gouvernementales surveillent étroitement 
les citoyens.
. . . des événements qui, en apparence, ne semblent 
pas avoir de lien sont souvent le résultat d’activités 
secrètes.
. . . il existe des organisations secrètes qui influencent con-
sidérablement les décisions politiques.
Appendix E
Instructions and response formats of the  quasi- 
behavioral measure of registration to the conspiracy 
newsletter.
If you wish to receive more information about the 
truth concerning different events and facts (delib-
erately hidden by the authorities) please select “I am 
interested in receiving this newsletter”.  You will receive 
approximately two private messages a month (“newslet-
ter about controversial events”) via private message in 
your Mturk account.  If you are not interested, please 
simply select “I am not interested in receiving this 
newsletter”.  Of course, your answer will have no impact 
on your payment.
I am not interested in receiving this newsletter I am interested in receiving this newsletter
° °
Notes
 1 All raw data and statistical scripts corresponding to all 
of the results presented in this paper are available at 
https://osf.io/k6zxr/.
 2 The four orders were: (1) CMQ/GCB/BCTI-10/single-
item (n = 37), (2) GCB/CMQ/single-item/BCTI-10 
(n = 39), (3) BCTI-10/single-item/GCB/CMQ (n = 38), 
(4) single-item/BCTI-10/CMQ /GCB (n = 38).
 3 The GCB scale could also be subdivided into five 
dimensions (Brotherton et al., 2013). Based on the 
initial structure of the scale, we computed the five 
dimensions of the GCB: government malfeasance (GM, 
n = 152, M = 2.86, SD = 0.93, α = .67), extraterrestrial 
cover-up (ET, n = 151, M = 1.78, SD = 0.92, α = .86), 
malevolent global conspiracies (MG, n = 152, M = 3.05, 
SD = 0.91, α = .74), personal well-being (PW, n = 152, 
M = 2.51, SD = 0.87, α = .59), and control of  information 
(CI, n = 152, M = 3.88, SD = 0.73, α = .54). The following 
results present the bivariate correlation coefficient (r) 
between the single-item conspiracy belief scale and 
each of the GCB’s five dimensions in Study 1: single-
item/GM = .49, 95% CI [.35, .60], p < .001; single-
item/ET = .21, [.05, .36], p = .01; single-item/MG = .33 
[.18, .46], p < .001; single-item/PW = .43, [.29, .55], 
p < .001; single-item/CI = .40 [.26, .53], p < .001.
 4 We retained the item numbers 1-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-14 
from the BCTI scale, to form the BCTI-10.
 5 Based on the initial structure of the scale, we com-
puted the five dimensions of the GCB: GM (n = 267, 
M = 2.90, SD = 1.12, α = .85), ET (n = 267, M = 2.27, 
SD = 1.19, α = .89), MG (n = 267, M = 2.68, SD = 1.18, 
α = .89), PW (n = 267, M = 2.59, SD = 1.06, α = .80), 
and CI (n = 267, M = 3.46, SD = 0.92, α = .66). The 
following results present the bivariate correlation coef-
ficient (r) between the single-item conspiracy belief 
scale and each of the GCB’s five dimensions in Study 2: 
single-item/GM = .70, 95% CI [.63, .76], p < .001; 
single-item/ET = .55, [.46, .63], p < .001; single-item/ 
MG = .65 [.57, .71], p < .001; single-item/PW = .59, [.51, .67], 
p < .001; single-item/CI = .54 [.45, .62], p < .001.
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